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INTRODUCTION
A prior conviction can affect an individual's life in many ways,
especially when the individual becomes involved in a subsequent legal
proceeding. The extent to which the prior conviction can have
* © 2012 Christopher R. Detwiler.
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significant legal effects, such as the loss of a civil right,1 often depends
upon the severity of the previously committed crime. Since legislators
frequently distinguish between more and less severe crimes on the
basis of the maximum potential term of imprisonment authorized for
the prior conviction,2 courts and lawyers often have to calculate the
potential term of imprisonment that the individual faced. This
calculation can prove to be complicated because courts may have to
consider whether to apply certain sentencing enhancements3 to the
prior conviction. For example, when a defendant is convicted for the
first time, courts can consider either the maximum punishment for a
first-time offender (i.e., the actual defendant) or the maximum
punishment for a defendant with the worst criminal history (i.e., a
hypothetical defendant). As the case of United States v. Simmons4
illustrates, the legal principles undergirding this calculation are
evolving, and the methods for making the calculation are changing.
In 2006, a North Carolina court convicted Jason Simmons of
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.5 Given the absence
of both aggravating factors and prior convictions, Simmons did not
face the possibility of imprisonment.6 In 2007, Simmons "pled guilty
to federal drug trafficking."' 7 The district court held that his prior
conviction under state law qualified as an offense "punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year," subjecting him to a
sentencing enhancement under the Controlled Substances Act.' As a
result of this enhancement, the court doubled his minimum sentence
1. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) (prohibiting possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon).
2. See id. (distinguishing between crimes that are punishable by a term of
imprisonment of more than one year and crimes that are punishable by a term of
imprisonment of one year or less).
3. The Supreme Court has distinguished between "sentencing factors" and
"elements." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 485 (2000). A sentencing factor
describes "a fact that was not found by a jury but that could affect the sentence imposed
by the judge." Id. in contrast, the jury must find elements of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 500 (Thomas, J., concurring). Yet another distinction relates to prior
convictions and aggravating factors. While the Supreme Court has noted that prior
convictions aggravate an offense, United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 386 (2008), this
Comment refers to aggravating factors as those facts other than a prior conviction that can
enhance a sentence. Thus, a "sentencing enhancement" refers to either a prior conviction
or an aggravating factor.
4. 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
5. Id. at 239.
6. Id. at 241. Simmons received six to eight months community service. Id. The
maximum punishment that Simmons could have received was eight months community
service. Id.
7. Id. at 239.
8. Id.
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and sentenced him to 120 months in prison.9 In the absence of this
enhancement, Simmons likely would have received a sentence
between sixty-three and seventy-eight months. 10 When determining
whether Simmons's prior state conviction qualified as an offense
"punishable by imprisonment for more than one year," the district
court followed the Fourth Circuit's then-established precedent as
articulated in United States v. Harp" and considered whether "any
defendant charged with that crime could receive a sentence of more
than one year." 2 It was irrelevant that Simmons could not have
received even a single day of imprisonment for his prior state
conviction. '1
Simmons appealed, and two recent United States Supreme Court
decisions, United States v. Rodriquez4 and Carachuri-Rosendo v.
Holder,15 called the Fourth Circuit's precedent into question. Since
these cases involved some consideration of the actual defendants'
situations, they may have implicitly overruled the Fourth Circuit's
method for calculating the maximum potential term of imprisonment
established in Harp, especially since the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded several Fourth Circuit cases relying on this approach "in
light of [Carachuri-Rosendo]."'16 Simmons's case was among the cases
vacated and remanded.17
In United States v. Simmons ("Simmons IP),1 the Fourth Circuit
held that these two Supreme Court cases did not affect its method of
calculating the maximum potential term of imprisonment. 19 However,
on rehearing en banc in United States v. Simmons ("Simmons H"),20
the Fourth Circuit held that its approach to the calculation had been
overruled by the Supreme Court.21 Thus, the Fourth Circuit now
considers the actual defendant's situation as opposed to a
hypothetical defendant.22 As a result of this change, the court vacated
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. 406 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2005).
12. Id. at 246.
13. See id.
14. 553 U.S. 377 (2008).
15. 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010).
16. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3455, 3455 (2010).
17. Id.
18. Simmons I, 635 F.3d 140, 141 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3455, remanded to
Simmons 1I, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
19. See, e.g., id. at 145-47.
20. Simmons II, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
21. Id. at 241.
22. Id. at 250.
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Simmons's sentence and remanded his case for a new sentencing
hearing.23
While both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court focused
on statutory interpretation in their analysis of the proper method for
calculating the maximum potential term of imprisonment, n portions
of the Supreme Court's opinion alluded to the related constitutional
requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.25 More specifically,
in Apprendi v. New Jersey,26 the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 27 The
Court's reasoning depended to a large extent on the definition of
"crime," which required a distinction between sentencing factors and
elements.2a
This distinction also relates to calculating the maximum potential
term of imprisonment for a prior conviction because the application
of a sentencing enhancement that affects the maximum potential term
could make the enhanced offense qualify as a separate and distinct
crime.2 9 As a result, the maximum potential term of imprisonment
could depend significantly upon the sentencing enhancements that
applied to the actual defendant because a prior conviction with an
enhancement and a prior conviction without an enhancement could
constitute convictions for different crimes. While this distinction
provides some insight into the proper method for calculating the
maximum potential term of imprisonment, it also raises many
questions regarding the specifics of the calculation.
This Comment focuses on the recent developments related to
determining the maximum potential term of imprisonment for a prior
conviction. Part I provides background by considering some of the
potential approaches to the issue and by discussing cases that have
adopted those approaches. Part II examines Simmons I and Simmons
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2580-83 (2010)
(interpreting the Controlled Substances Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act).
25. See, e.g., id. at 2581 n.3 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,
227 (1998)); id. at 2582 n.6 (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 247).
26. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
27. Id. at 490.
28. See id. at 499-500 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("This case turns on the seemingly
simple question of what constitutes a 'crime.' "); supra note 3.
29. See Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2581 n.3 (distinguishing between "felony
simple possession" and "misdemeanor simple possession" on the basis of the application
of a recidivist enhancement).
[Vol. 901150
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II and analyzes the competing viewpoints in those cases. Finally, Part
III considers the implications of these recent developments and
discusses the complexities inherent to this calculation that remain
unresolved.
I. BACKGROUND
The United States Supreme Court's cases on the right to trial by
jury describe the "maximum authorized penalty" for a crime as an
"objective indication[] of the seriousness with which society regards
the offense."3 Congress often relies on this objective standard when
making certain statutory provisions, such as sentencing
enhancements, conditional upon a crime's severity. To determine
whether the conditional provision applies, courts often must calculate
the maximum potential term of imprisonment for a prior conviction,
what this Comment refers to as the "Maximum Potential Term
Issue."31 Congress has passed numerous statutes that require courts to
make this calculation,32 and courts have considered and adopted a
variety of approaches to the Maximum Potential Term Issue. This
Part considers the potential approaches to the issue and the ways in
which courts have addressed it.
30. Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989) (citations omitted); see
also id. at 543 (distinguishing between "serious" offenses and "petty" offenses in the
context of the right to trial by jury in a criminal case). To avoid confusion with the term
"serious," which has a special meaning in the context of the right to trial by jury, this
Comment refers to crimes as "more" or "less" severe.
31. See, e.g., Simmons I, 649 F.3d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (considering
whether to apply a sentencing enhancement).
32. For example, Congress has chosen to prohibit individuals who have been
convicted of certain crimes from possessing firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006).
Congress also has enacted laws in the immigration context where prior convictions of
more severe crimes can trigger conditional provisions. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)
(2006) (defining an "aggravated felony"); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006) (providing that a
permanent resident can apply to the Attorney General for cancellation of removal if,
among other things, the permanent resident "has not been convicted of an aggravated
felony"). In adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress made the admissibility of
certain prior convictions conditional upon the severity of the crime. See FED. R. EVID.
609(a)(1)(A). Congress has enacted laws that include conditional provisions with regard to
sentencing as well. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006). These provisions represent
some but not all of the instances where Congress has made a provision conditional upon
the severity of a crime.
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A. Potential Approaches to the Maximum Potential Term Issue
1. Actual Sentence Approach
There are four general ways a court could address the Maximum
Potential Term Issue. First, courts could simply consider the actual
punishment imposed-the "Actual Sentence Approach."33  For
example, if the defendant was sentenced to more than one year, then
the conditional provision, such as a sentencing enhancement, would
apply. This approach has the dual benefits of clarity and efficiency
because courts simply can look to the defendant's record of
conviction to determine whether or not the judge sentenced him to
more than one year.34 Furthermore, since the judge bases the
sentence on the specific factual circumstances of the defendant and
the crime, this approach more accurately determines whether the
underlying conduct should qualify as severe.35 Congress has enacted
provisions that focus on the actual sentence with respect to some
deportation standards and some sentencing guidelines,36 but courts
have rejected this approach in other contexts.37
2. Actual Defendant Approach
A second approach-the "Actual Defendant Approach"-
focuses on the maximum potential sentence that the actual defendant
faced for the prior conviction, not the actual sentence that the
defendant received. This approach would prove more burdensome
for courts to apply because it may require examining the
characteristics of the defendant (e.g., criminal history), considering
the manner in which the defendant committed the crime (e.g., while
33. For an example of scholarship advocating that Congress amend federal statutes to
follow this method, see Ethan Davis, Comment, The Sentence Imposed Versus the
Statutory Maximum: Repairing the Armed Career Criminal Act, 118 YALE L.J. 369, 370
(2008).
34. See id. at 374-75. One could divide this approach into two different variations,
depending on the sentencing system utilized in the jurisdiction. For example, if the judge
sentenced the defendant in an indeterminant system to nine to fifteen months, and if the
defendant only served ten, then one could argue both that the hypothetical provision
applied and that it did not. One side would focus on the actual time served while the other
would focus on the maximum term authorized.
35. See id. at 372-73.
36. See id. at 373.
37. See Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., 460 U.S. 103, 113 (1983); see also United
States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 972-73 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating in the context of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) that "it is the potential sentence that controls and not the one actually
imposed").
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possessing a firearm), and applying the relevant jurisdiction's
statutes.38 The Fourth Circuit followed this approach in Simmons IL 39
3. Hypothetical Defendant with All Enhancements Approach
Under a third approach-the "Hypothetical Defendant with All
Enhancements Approach"-courts could calculate the maximum
possible sentence for a hypothetical defendant and take into account
the worst possible criminal history and the presence of the most
aggravating factors. While still potentially involving the consideration
of another jurisdiction's law, this approach has the benefit of not
requiring a court to consider the actual defendant's criminal record or
the manner in which the defendant committed the crime. Thus, once
a court has ruled that the commission of a certain crime triggers a
conditional provision, courts could apply the provision easily and
consistently to everyone who committed that crime.
The Fourth Circuit took this approach in United States v. Jones"
and in Harp, which previously represented the Fourth Circuit's
position on this issue. In Jones, the defendant was charged with
violating the federal law prohibiting convicted felons from possessing
firearms," and he "moved to dismiss his indictment contending that
his predicate crime was not punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year."42 The defendant based this contention on the
fact that he personally could not have received a sentence of greater
than twelve months for the predicate crime, essentially arguing that
the court should adopt the Actual Defendant Approach. 43 The court,
however, noted that a defendant with the worst criminal history and
more aggravating factors than mitigating factors could receive a
38. See Davis, supra note 33, at 372-75. Although courts often consider the law of
other jurisdictions in their opinions, this practice introduces speculation into a criminal
proceeding that may have significant consequences for the defendant. However, courts
often cannot avoid undertaking this task. See, e.g., United States v. Pruitt, 545 F.3d 416,
419 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying North Carolina law to determine whether the defendant's
prior conviction qualified as a conditional trigger under federal law). When Congress and
state legislatures enact laws that depend on the outcome (or potential outcome) of a
previous case in any jurisdiction, this problem occurs frequently.
39. Simmons I1, 649 F.3d 237, 243 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
40. 195 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 1999).
41. Jones, 195 F.3d at 206 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006)).
42. Id.
43. Id. ("Jones argue[d] that the district court erred in holding that his prior state
felon-in-possession conviction was 'a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year,' because under North Carolina's sentencing scheme, his maximum
sentence did not exceed twelve months.").
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maximum term of imprisonment of thirty months for the predicate
crime under North Carolina law.'
The Jones court began its analysis of the statute by citing
Dickerson v. New Banner Institute,45 the United States Supreme
Court's opinion that rejected the Actual Sentence Approach.46 In that
case, the Supreme Court emphasized that "[i]t was plainly irrelevant
to Congress whether the individual in question actually receives a
prison term; the statute imposes disabilities on one convicted of a
'crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.' ""
Although the Fourth Circuit in Jones did not explicitly distinguish
between the Actual Sentence Approach and the Actual Defendant
Approach, it approvingly quoted the district court's analysis of the
statute4" to emphasize that all characteristics of the defendant (i.e.,
criminal history) and the manner in which the defendant committed
the crime (i.e., with or without aggravating circumstances) were
irrelevant because the statute related to the crime, not the
defendant.49  Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit adopted the
Hypothetical Defendant with All Enhancements Approach.5"
Harp also addressed the Maximum Potential Term Issue
discussed in Jones, but it did so in the context of a federal sentencing
enhancement instead of a challenge to unlawful possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon.5 1 The defendant disputed whether one
of his prior state convictions qualified as a crime "punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."52 If it did, he was
subject to a sentencing enhancement.53 He argued that the facts
44. See id. at 207 ("To Jones, the fact that the maximum imprisonment time for [the
crime at issue] is 30 months is irrelevant.").
45. 460 U.S. 103 (1983).
46. See Jones, 195 F.3d at 207 (citing Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 113).
47. Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 113 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006)).
48. Jones, 195 F.3d at 207 ("[I]n § 922(g)(1), 'punishable' is an adjective used to
describe 'crime.' As such, it is more closely linked to the conduct, the crime, than it is to
the individual convicted of the conduct. Congress could have written § 922(g)(1)
differently had it intended to focus on the individual in particular rather than the crime for
which the individual was convicted. Instead of the phrase, 'individual convicted ... of a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,' Congress could have
used the phrase, 'individual punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year' or
even 'individual sentenced for imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.' " (internal
citations omitted)).
49. See id. ("[T]he offense statutory maximum [is] the statutory maximum for the
crime, regardless of the criminal record status of the defendant.").
50. See id.
51. See United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 245 (4th Cir. 2005).
52. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(b) (2002)).
53. Id.
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underlying his prior conviction did not support a finding of
aggravating circumstances and that since the maximum potential non-
aggravated sentence was twelve months, the prior conviction did not
qualify.54 Finding the defendant's focus on aggravating factors
unpersuasive, the court reaffirmed the approach it used in Jones:
"[T]o determine whether a conviction is for a crime punishable by a
prison term exceeding one year, Jones dictates that we consider the
maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed for that crime
upon a defendant with the worst possible criminal history. "
55
4. No Enhancements Approach
Finally, a fourth approach-the "No Enhancements
Approach"-would consider the maximum possible sentence for a
hypothetical defendant without taking into account any criminal
history or aggravating factors.56 Justice Souter appears to have
supported this approach in his Rodriquez dissent.57 Essentially, this
approach would consider the sentence that a first-time offender could
receive without committing the crime in an aggravated manner.58
Courts could just look to the maximum punishment authorized for a
first-time offender without any upward departures for aggravating
circumstances.5 9
54. Id. at 246.
55. Id. (citing Jones, 195 F.3d at 206-08) (maintaining that a crime qualified under the
statute "if any defendant charged with that crime could receive a sentence of more than
one year").
56. For an example of scholarship noting the simplicity of this approach, see Krystle
Lamprecht, Comment, Formal, Categorical, but Incomplete: The Need for a New Standard
in Evaluating Prior Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1407, 1433 (2008) ("The simplest, but ultimately imperfect, standard for
ACCA's sentencing requirement would be to evaluate sentences for prior convictions in
terms of the maximum sentence available for that conviction under state law, without any
additional sentencing enhancements.").
57. See United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 404 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("It does not defy common English or common sense, after all, to look at a statute with
one penalty range for the basic crime and a higher one for a repeat offender and say that
the former sets the maximum penalty for the 'offense'; but neither is it foolish to see the
'offense' as defined by its penalty, however that is computed. What I have said so far
suggests that I think the basic-crime view of 'offense' is the better one, but I will concede
that the competing positions are pretty close to evenly matched.").
58. See id. at 393-94 (considering the different ways a court could interpret the term
"serious drug offense").
59. See id. (contemplating whether a judge should consider sentencing enhancements
when determining the maximum potential term of imprisonment).
2012] 1155
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5. Hybrid Approaches
In his Rodriquez dissent, Justice Souter noted the complexities
inherent in the Maximum Potential Term Issue. 60 He recognized the
possibility of taking into account aggravating factors and/or a prior
criminal record and the possibility of considering the actual defendant
or a hypothetical defendant, which greatly increases the number of
potential approaches.6' In United States v. Pruitt,2 the Sixth Circuit
took just such a hybrid approach when it considered whether the
defendant's prior North Carolina conviction qualified to enhance his
sentence because it was a crime "punishable by death or
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. "63 The court rejected
the Fourth Circuit's Harp and Jones approach of calculating the
maximum potential term of imprisonment for a defendant with both
the worst aggravating factors and the worst criminal history.64
Instead, the Sixth Circuit held that the proper calculation should
take into account the actual defendant's prior record level,65 but it
seemed to agree with the Fourth Circuit's Harp and Jones approach
on aggravating factors.66 It held that, regardless of the manner in
which the defendant committed the crime and regardless of whether
the jury actually found the factors beyond a reasonable doubt (or the
defendant admitted to them), the proper calculation should include
60. See id. at 396 n.2.
61. Id. ("Even adopting the 'alternative' of accounting for an offender's circumstances
and record does not resolve the ambiguity, for this rubric actually comprises multiple
possibilities under its generic umbrella. Most simply, it might be thought to refer to the
actual offender's sentencing range as applied by the state court. At the other extreme, it
might mean the maximum for a purely hypothetical 'worst' offender who incurs all
possible add-ons. Or perhaps it means a fictional version of the actual offender, say, one
qualifying for some statutory add-ons but not for any guidelines rules (as the Court would
have it); or maybe one who qualifies for both the statutory and the guidelines departures
for which the actual offender was eligible, even though not all of those departures were
applied by the state court. This menagerie of options would be multiplied, if a court
directly confronted the choice whether to count enhancements for offender-based factors
other than recidivism, and if so, which.").
62. 545 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2008).
63. Id. at 417 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1
(2002)).
64. See id. at 417-18 ("In determining whether Pruitt's prior convictions qualified as
predicates, the district court did not consider Pruitt's prior record level, but rather
considered the maximum sentence allowable for a hypothetical defendant with the worst
prior record level. Because this was procedural error, Pruitt's sentence must be vacated
and his case remanded for resentencing.").
65. See id. at 418-19.
66. See id. at 421.
2012] UNITED STATES v. SIMMONS 1157
the maximum aggravated sentence.6 7 Thus, at least with respect to
North Carolina's sentencing system, the Sixth Circuit appeared to
take a hybrid approach by calculating the maximum term of
imprisonment based upon the actual defendant's prior record level
and hypothetical aggravating circumstances.
B. Supreme Court Decisions Relating to the Maximum Potential
Term Issue
While the Supreme Court has not expressly stated that a certain
approach should apply in all circumstances, some relatively recent
cases shed light on the Maximum Potential Term Issue. The Supreme
Court has considered what constitutes a "crime" or "offense" in many
cases.68 The definition depends significantly upon the distinction
between sentencing factors and elements.69  The Court has
endeavored to make this distinction both in the context of statutory
interpretation7 ° and with respect to constitutional requirements.7
Some cases focused on the contents of an indictment,72 while others
focused on which facts the prosecution must submit to a jury and
prove beyond a reasonable doubt.73
These cases have important implications for the Maximum
Potential Term Issue. If an aggravating factor qualifies as an element,
then a prior conviction for the aggravated offense may be separate
67. Id. ("But whether Pruitt was actually sentenced to the aggravated range or could
have been sentenced to the aggravated range is not pertinent to the determination of
whether his prior convictions were 'punishable' by a term exceeding one year."). But see
id. at 427 (Merritt, J., dissenting) ("Because aggravators were not present in the two prior
state convictions and it would be impermissible for a North Carolina state judge to find
such aggravators were Pruitt sentenced for the same crimes today, it is contrary to law to
find that an 'aggravated sentence' should serve as the 'maximum punishment authorized'
for Pruitt's state convictions."(citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004))).
68. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 499-500 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("This case turns on the seemingly simple question of what constitutes a
'crime.' ").
69. See, e.g., Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2581 n.3 (2010)
(distinguishing between "felony simple possession" and "misdemeanor simple possession"
on the basis of the application of a recidivist enhancement).
70. See, e.g., id. at 2580-83 (interpreting the Controlled Substances Act and the
Immigration and Nationality Act).
71. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469 ("The question presented is whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination
authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years
be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.").
72. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998)
(considering whether the Constitution requires that the prosecution charge a recidivist
enhancement in the indictment).
73. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
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and distinct from a prior conviction for the non-aggravated offense.74
Thus, the presence or absence of an aggravating factor can make the
difference between a conditional provision applying or not applying
to the defendant. As a result, it is important to consider the
implications of these cases on the Maximum Potential Term Issue.
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 75 the Supreme Court
considered whether a recidivist enhancement constituted an element
of a crime. 76 If so, then the recidivist enhancement would establish a
separate offense, and the Government would have to charge the prior
conviction in the indictment.7 7 The five-Justice majority stated that
while Congress had the power to establish which facts constituted
elements and which facts constituted sentencing factors, the
Constitution did place certain limits on this power.7 1 Focusing on the
intent of Congress as manifested in the structure and language of the
statute, the Court held that the recidivist enhancement was not an
element; therefore, it did not establish a separate offense.79 After
reviewing the implications of some of its prior related cases, the
majority then rejected the petitioner's argument that the Constitution
required treating the prior conviction as an element.8"
In contrast, the four-Justice dissent invoked the doctrine of
"constitutional doubt" to avoid the issue of whether the Constitution
requires treating the prior conviction as an element.8' In so doing, the
dissent stated: "I think it beyond question that there was, until today's
unnecessary resolution of the point, 'serious doubt' whether the
Constitution permits a defendant's sentencing exposure to be
increased tenfold on the basis of a fact that is not charged, tried to a
jury, and found beyond a reasonable doubt."82 The dissent then
74. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226.
75. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
76. Id. at 226 ("The question before us is whether [the recidivist enhancement]
defines a separate crime or simply authorizes an enhanced penalty.").
77. Id.
78. Id. at 228 (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84-91 (1986)).
79. See id. at 235 ("In sum, we believe that Congress intended to set forth a sentencing
factor.., and not a separate criminal offense.").
80. Id. at 239-47 (failing to "find sufficient support" for petitioner's claim "that the
Constitution requires Congress to treat recidivism as an element of the offense-
irrespective of Congress' contrary intent").
81. Id. at 249-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[W]here a statute is susceptible of two
constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the
other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter." (quoting
United States ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
82. Id. at 260.
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interpreted the statute as establishing a separate offense with the
recidivist enhancement as an element.83
When considering a federal statute a year later in Jones v. United
States, 4 the Supreme Court stated that
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any
fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted
to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.85
A year after Jones, the Supreme Court applied this requirement to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Apprendi.86 In
another five-to-four decision, the Court invalidated a sentencing
enhancement that was based upon the commission of a hate crime
that the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence in
accordance with New Jersey law.87 The Court again distinguished
between an element of the offense and a sentencing factor and
rejected New Jersey's assertion that the biased purpose sentencing
enhancement did not qualify as an element.88 Correspondingly, the
Court also rejected the State's claim that its legislature had not
created a separate offense.89
Although the Court did not overrule the exception for prior
convictions established in Almendarez-Torres, it noted that the issue
of prior convictions was not before it and expressed doubt as to that
decision's continued validity, stating that "it is arguable that
Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided" and "a logical
application of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue
were contested."9 Further undermining the validity of the prior
conviction exception established in Almendarez-Torres, Justice
Thomas, who joined the five-Justice majority in that case, changed
course, stating in his concurring opinion in Apprendi that a prior
conviction constituted an element of the crime when it increased the
maximum potential term of imprisonment.91  Although there
83. Id. at 270.
84. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
85. Id. at 243 n.6.
86. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,476 (2000).
87. Id. at 491-92.
88. Id. at 491-93; id. at 493 ("The defendant's intent in committing a crime is perhaps
as close as one might hope to come to a core criminal offense 'element.' ").
89. Id. at 495-96.
90. Id. at 489-90.
91. Id. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas explicitly recognized the basis
for his mistake when he stated that "one of the chief errors of Almendarez-Torres-an
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apparently were five Justices on the Court who disagreed with the
prior conviction exception at the time of Apprendi, the Court has not
overruled its holding in Almendarez- Torres.
The Court continued to develop the implications of Apprendi
and its predecessors in the following years. In Blakely v.
Washington,92 the Court applied the rule from Apprendi to invalidate
a sentence above the standard statutory range because the judge, not
the jury, determined that the defendant had committed the crime
"with deliberate cruelty."93 Then, in United States v. Booker,94 the
Supreme Court again emphasized the constitutional requirement that
the jury find any fact beyond a reasonable doubt that increases the
defendant's sentence above the statutory maximum under the federal
sentencing system.
95
It is important, however, to note the scope of these rulings. If the
jury's verdict or the defendant's admissions necessarily entail a
certain fact, then the judge can rely on that fact to enhance a
sentence. 96 Along these lines, the "statutory maximum" is the
error to which I succumbed-was to attempt to discern whether a particular fact is
traditionally (or typically) a basis for a sentencing court to increase an offender's
sentence." Id. at 520.
92. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
93. Id. at 303. Notably, the defendant in Harp cited Blakely to argue that the
Hypothetical Defendant with All Enhancements Approach violated his constitutional
rights because it involved a sentencing enhancement for aggravating factors to which he
had not admitted and that the jury had not found beyond a reasonable doubt. See United
States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2005). The Fourth Circuit, however, read
Blakely narrowly, claiming that it only applied to the "process by which the elements of [a]
crime and other relevant facts must be determined." Id. at 247 (quoting United States v.
McAllister, 272 F.3d 228, 232 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
court then stated that "North Carolina courts have already concluded that the state
sentencing regime can accommodate the process that Blakely demands," id. (citing State v.
Harris, 166 N.C. App. 386, 394, 602 S.E.2d 697, 702 (2004)), provided that "facts
supporting the enhancement are charged in an indictment and found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. (citing State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 597-98, 548 S.E.2d 712, 731-32
(2001)). Thus, the court appeared to reason that since North Carolina courts can comply
with Blakely when applying a sentencing enhancement, courts should apply both criminal
history and aggravating factor enhancements to the fullest extent possible when
calculating the maximum term of imprisonment for a prior offense.
To a certain extent, the court's distinction between calculating the severity of a
crime and determining the length of a defendant's sentence makes sense. After all, the
Sixth Amendment protects individuals from sentencing enhancements that do not have a
proper basis; however, it does not prevent Congress from passing a statute that utilizes
sentencing enhancements to determine the severity of a crime. See infra Part III.C.
94. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
95. Id. at 232.
96. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 ("[T]he 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is
the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."); see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602
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maximum permissible sentence for a crime based solely upon those
facts that the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt or that the
defendant admits.97 Therefore, the Apprendi limitation would not
apply when the law provides a permissible range of sentences and the
judge imposes a sentence toward the higher end because, for
example, the defendant refused to accept responsibility, did not
express remorse, or committed the crime in a brutal manner-facts
that neither the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt nor the
defendant admitted.98
On the other hand, the Apprendi limitation would apply if the
law provided a permissible range of sentences and further provided a
sentencing enhancement that applied only if the defendant committed
the crime in a cruel manner and the judge, not the jury, found that the
sentencing enhancement applied.99 In Blakely, the Supreme Court
distinguished between these two examples on the basis that the
former example does not violate a defendant's "legal right" to a
sentence within the permissible range for the crime, while the latter
example does violate such a right by taking the defendant's
punishment outside of the range for which the jury found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.1"° Thus, both the
statutory language and the type of sentencing system can play crucial
roles in determining whether a judge can impose a sentence that
involves an upward departure.
(2002) ("A defendant may not be 'expose[d] ... to a penalty exceeding the maximum he
would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.'"
(quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483)).
97. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303.
98. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481-82 (2000); see also State v. Stover,
104 P.3d 969, 972-73 (Idaho 2005) (interpreting Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker in the
context of Idaho's sentencing system and finding that the Apprendi rule did not apply to
indeterminate sentencing systems).
99. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 309.
100. Id. ("Indeterminate sentencing... increases judicial discretion, to be sure, but not
at the expense of the jury's traditional function of finding the facts essential to lawful
imposition of the penalty. Of course indeterminate schemes involve judicial factfinding, in
that a judge (like a parole board) may implicitly rule on those facts he deems important to
the exercise of his sentencing discretion. But the facts do not pertain to whether the
defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence-and that makes all the difference insofar
as judicial impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned. In a system that
says the judge may punish burglary with 10 to 40 years, every burglar knows he is risking
40 years in jail. In a system that punishes burglary with a 10-year sentence, with another 30
added for use of a gun, the burglar who enters a home unarmed is entitled to no more than
a 10-year sentence-and by reason of the Sixth Amendment the facts bearing upon that
entitlement must be found by a jury.").
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Although the Supreme Court only briefly mentioned the effect
of these cases on the Maximum Potential Term Issue, the Court may
have had these cases in mind when making its two recent rulings in
Rodriquez and Carachuri-Rosendo. Both Rodriquez and Carachuri-
Rosendo relate to the Maximum Potential Term Issue more directly
than Almendarez-Torres, Apprendi, and other related cases, but they
do not address all of the underlying questions or complexities.
In Rodriquez, the defendant had three prior convictions under
state law for delivery of a controlled substance. 1' The state statute
provided for a maximum term of imprisonment of five years for the
first offense and ten years for any subsequent offense of the same
provision. 2 If the potential ten-year sentence for either the second or
third offense constituted "the maximum term of imprisonment
prescribed by law," then the defendant faced a mandatory minimum
of fifteen years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (the
"ACCA"). 1°3 These facts led the Court to make three important
conclusions regarding the Maximum Potential Term Issue.
First, the Court held that the proper calculation of the maximum
term of imprisonment should take recidivist enhancements into
account.0 4 The Court reasoned that the plain meaning of the ACCA
required applying the recidivist provisions for two reasons. If the
maximum term did not include recidivist enhancements, then a repeat
offender could receive a term of imprisonment greater than the
maximum "prescribed by law," a result that the Court found "hard to
accept."'15 Furthermore, judges and attorneys take recidivist
enhancements into account when informing defendants of the
maximum terms of imprisonment they are facing.
0 6
Next, the Court noted that when determining the maximum
potential term of imprisonment for a prior conviction, courts should
not follow the maximum punishment in an advisory guideline but the
maximum punishment allowed under state law.0 7 The Court reasoned
that the law allows upward departures from the guidelines and cited
statutes using similar language that supported its conclusion.0 8 It was
this part of the Court's holding that inspired the Sixth Circuit in Pruitt
101. United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 380 (2008).
102. See id. at 381 (citing WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii)-(iv), 69.50.408(a)
(1994)).
103. Id. at 381-82.
104. Id. at 382-84.
105. Id. at 383.
106. Id. at 383-84.
107. Id. at 390.
108. Id. at 390-92.
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to maintain that courts should always take into account potential
aggravating factors that result in upward departures from
presumptive sentencing ranges.10 9
Finally, despite finding for the Government in Rodriquez, the
Court's opinion provided an indication that it would support
consideration of the actual defendant's situation. ° Most importantly,
the Court stated that in "cases in which the records that may properly
be consulted do not show that the defendant faced the possibility of a
recidivist enhancement, it may well be that the Government will be
precluded from establishing that a conviction was for a qualifying
offense." '111 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Pruitt stated that this
language "clearly conveys [the Supreme Court's] understanding that
the recidivism enhancement can be accounted for in determining the
'maximum term of imprisonment' under the ACCA only if the
particular defendant was subject to the enhancement."' 2 Thus,
Rodriquez appears to stand for three important propositions that
relate to the Maximum Potential Term Issue: (1) courts should take
recidivist enhancements into account; (2) guidelines do not cap the
maximum term of imprisonment; and (3) courts should consider the
actual defendant's situation when applying recidivist enhancements.
It is also important to note an argument that the dissent found
compelling but that the majority rejected in conclusory fashion. The
defendant argued that "offense" means the elements of the crime
only, not potential sentencing enhancements.113 Justice Souter found
this argument plausible in his dissent, emphasizing that "offense"
could refer to just the statutory crime and its elements, in which case
only the punishment for a first-time offender would apply.114 He also
found plausible the majority's interpretation of "offense," which it
characterized as referring to "a specific occurrence" and therefore
included consideration of the defendant's criminal history and
potential aggravating factors. 15 While Justice Souter preferred the
defendant's argument, he conceded that the two interpretations were
"pretty close to evenly matched."" 6 Applying the rule of lenity," 7 he
109. United States v. Pruitt, 545 F.3d 416, 421-24 (6th Cir. 2008).
110. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at 389.
111. Id.
112. Pruitt, 545 F.3d at 423 (emphasis added).
113. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at 384.
114. See id. at 393-94 (Souter, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 394.
116. Id. at 404.
117. "This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal
statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an
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ultimately sided with the defendant." 8 The defendant's argument and
Justice Souter's analysis are significant because the distinction
between elements and sentencing factors figured prominently in
Apprendi and related cases.119
In Carachuri-Rosendo, the immigrant-petitioner committed two
misdemeanor drug offenses under Texas law. 120 As a result, he faced
removal from the United States.12' If the second offense did not
qualify as an "aggravated felony," however, then he could seek
cancellation of removal from the United States Attorney General.
122
The Court held that the second conviction did not qualify as an
aggravated felony, so the petitioner could apply for cancellation of
removal. 123
The Carachuri-Rosendo Court reasoned that the state prosecutor
had failed to charge the petitioner as a recidivist in the second
prosecution, thereby denying him his right to notice and his ability to
challenge the conviction for the purposes of subsequent immigration
proceedings. 24 The Court further reasoned that although a recidivist
charge could have made the second offense punishable by more than
one year under federal law, immigration courts cannot rely on this
fact because it is outside of the record. 125 As a result, the Court
appeared to require that courts consider the actual defendant's
situation and that they safeguard his procedural rights regarding the
recidivist enhancement. These requirements, however, may only have
arisen due to the unique immigration context of the case.
The Carachuri-Rosendo Court clarified the principle in Lopez v.
Gonzales126 that to qualify as an" 'aggravated felony' for immigration
law purposes, a state drug conviction must be punishable as a felony
under federal law."' 127 In other words, the underlying conduct that
supported the state conviction would have to support a hypothetical
conviction under federal law as well.2 8 Thus, in determining whether
Carachuri-Rosendo's state conviction was "punishable as a felony
interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended." Id. at
405 (citing Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958)).
118. Id. at 404-05.
119. See supra notes 74-106 and accompanying text.
120. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2580 (2010).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2581.
123. Id. at 2580.
124. Id. at 2581-82.
125. Id. at 2586-89.
126. 549 U.S. 47 (2006).
127. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2582 (citing Lopez, 549 U.S. at 56).
128. See id. (discussing the application of this requirement in the immigration context).
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under federal law," the Court focused on a federal statute requiring
the prosecutor "to charge a defendant as a recidivist in the criminal
information" before seeking a recidivist enhancement. 129 Since the
state prosecutor did not honor this procedural requirement, the Court
reasoned, the state conviction was not punishable as a felony under
federal law. 130
Like the dissent in Rodriquez and the Apprendi line of cases, the
Supreme Court in Carachuri-Rosendo recognized a distinction
between two types of "offenses": simple possession and recidivist
simple possession.131 Notably, the Court stated that a judge must have
found that the prior conviction occurred by a preponderance of the
evidence for the offense to qualify as recidivist simple possession.
13 2
This distinction has important implications for the Maximum
Potential Term Issue because it suggests that including a recidivist
enhancement changes both the type of crime as well as the potential
punishment. Therefore, if the prosecution does not charge the
defendant as a recidivist, then the defendant is convicted of a lesser
crime that may not qualify for certain conditional provisions. In this
case, the right to apply for cancellation of removal was the relevant
conditional provision.
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Carachuri-Rosendo addressed the
issue differently, however. He made a distinction between elements
and sentencing factors, stating that a "defendant is not 'convicted' of
sentencing factors, but only the elements of the crime charged in the
indictment." '133 Since Carachuri-Rosendo was only convicted of the
elements of simple possession, he was not convicted of a crime that
qualified as a felony under federal law, which would require both
those elements and a recidivist finding to enhance the punishment to
the felony level.134 Under Justice Scalia's approach, it appears that
Carachuri-Rosendo would not have been convicted of an aggravated
felony, even if the state prosecutor had charged him as a recidivist and
honored his procedural rights. 3
129. Id. at 2587. Although the defendant argued that he also must have notice and "an
opportunity to defend against that charge," the Court did not decide this issue because it
was unnecessary to its ruling. Id. at 2586.
130. Id. at 2589-90.
131. Id. at 2581 n.3.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2591.
134. Id.
135. For a discussion of the implications of Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in
Carachuri-Rosendo, see infra Part III.A.
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II. UNITED STATES V. SIMMONS
A. The Fourth Circuit's Response to Rodriquez and Carachuri-
Rosendo in Simmons I and Simmons II
After the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Simmons's case
"in light of Carachuri-Rosendo,' 136 the Fourth Circuit considered the
applicability of Carachuri-Rosendo and Rodriquez in Simmons 1.137
Simmons contested the sentencing enhancement imposed as a result
of his prior North Carolina conviction. 138 The Fourth Circuit held that
136. Simmons v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3455 (2010). The Supreme Court vacated and
remanded a total of twenty-six cases "in light of Carachuri-Rosendo," eight of which were
criminal cases remanded to the Fourth Circuit: Brandon v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 508
(2010); Blackwood v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 161 (2010); White v. United States, 131 S.
Ct. 84 (2010); Summers v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 80 (2010); Smith v. United States, 130
S. Ct. 3466 (2010); Williams v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3464 (2010); Simmons v. United
States, 130 S. Ct. 3455 (2010); Watson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3455 (2010). The Court
remanded six criminal cases to the Fifth Circuit: Pulido-Islas v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
596 (2010); Carrizosa-Flores v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 114 (2010); Mares-Calderon v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 80 (2010); Reyes-Hobbs v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3467 (2010);
Rodriguez v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3457 (2010); Garza-Gonzalez v. United States, 130
S. Ct. 3456 (2010). Not including Carachuri-Rosendo, the Court remanded three
immigration cases to the Fifth Circuit: Alexis v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 3462 (2010); Young v.
Holder, 130 S. Ct. 3455 (2010); Cardona-Lopez v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 3452 (2010). The
Court remanded eight immigration cases to the Seventh Circuit: Beckford v. Holder, 130
S. Ct. 3463 (2010); Lopez-Mendoza v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 3463 (2010); Ramirez-Solis v.
Holder, 130 S. Ct. 3463 (2010); Rodriguez-Diaz v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 3463 (2010); Alvarez
v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 3461 (2010); Garbutt v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 3460 (2010); Escobar v.
Holder, 130 S. Ct. 3451 (2010); Fernandez v. Holder, 130 S. Ct 3451 (2010). The Court also
remanded one criminal case to the Eighth Circuit: Haltiwanger v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
81 (2010). Thus, the Court remanded a total of fifteen criminal cases and eleven
immigration cases, not including Carachuri-Rosendo. The Court remanded only criminal
cases to the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, while remanding only immigration cases to the
Seventh Circuit. The Court remanded both criminal and immigration cases only to the
Fifth Circuit. While these numbers could indicate the Supreme Court's questioning of the
precedents in these circuits, they also could reflect the fact that only attorneys in these
circuits raised the relevant issues on appeal.
137. Simmons 1, 635 F.3d 140,141 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3455, remanded to
Simmons 11, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The Fourth Circuit stated in Simmons
I that Rodriquez did not overrule Harp. See id. at 142. The Fourth Circuit considered the
applicability of Rodriquez in Simmons's first appeal. United States v. Simmons, 340 F.
App'x 141, 144 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). The court, however, provided little more than
a conclusory analysis of how Rodriquez affected its precedents, stating that it actually
supported rather than undermined its precedents. Id. ("If anything, the Supreme Court's
analysis in Rodriquez is in harmony with the ratio decidendi of our prior holdings in Harp
and Jones, which require us to 'consider the maximum aggravated sentence that could be
imposed for that crime upon a defendant with the worst possible criminal history.'"
(quoting United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242,246 (4th Cir. 2005))).
138. Simmons I, 635 F.3d at 141.
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Rodriquez and Carachuri-Rosendo did not undermine its precedent in
Harp. 
139
The court provided several reasons for its holding. First, the
court began by noting the procedural posture of the case, stating
"when the Supreme Court grants certiorari, vacates an opinion, and
remands for further consideration, it makes no determination on the
merits of the underlying opinion. ' 140 To emphasize that it was free to
disregard the ruling in Carachuri-Rosendo, the court added that "such
an order indicates that intervening case law may affect the outcome of
the litigation and that the intermediary appellate court should have
the opportunity to fully consider the issue in light of the additional
precedent. 141 Second, the court recognized the distinction between
an immigration proceeding and criminal sentencing, although it did
not find this distinction dispositive 14 Third, the court found that the
plain meaning of the statute in Carachuri-Rosendo differed "in
critical respects" from the plain meaning of the sentencing statute it
was considering."' It found this difference dispositive. 144 The court
distinguished Carachuri-Rosendo's conviction as "a[n] aggravated
felony" 145 from Simmons's conviction for an "offense ... punishable
by more than one year of incarceration."1 46 It went on to describe the
former as "necessarily defendant-specific" because it related to how
the state prosecutor charged Carachuri-Rosendo and the latter as
"offense-specific" because it related to the punishment for the
offense. 147 In so doing, the court appeared to accept the
Government's argument that "there is a difference between the
hypothetical disfavored in Carachuri-Rosendo-whether the
defendant could have been prosecuted, but was not, for a particular
offense-and the analysis engaged in here-whether the offense for
which the defendant was actually convicted could have provided a
particular term of imprisonment." 148
139. Id. at 142, 147 n.6.
140. Id. at 144.
141. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court went on to state that "[a]fter
reviewing the issue anew, we are free to enter the same judgment if we conclude that the
new precedent does not require a different outcome, just as we may conclude that the
intervening precedent will result in a different outcome." Id. at 144-45 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
142. Id. at 145.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 144.
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On rehearing en banc in Simmons II, the Fourth Circuit held that
Rodriquez and Carachuri-Rosendo did overrule Harp.'49 The court
emphasized that Carachuri-Rosendo had rejected the Government's
argument that the statute in question "created only one 'offense,' and
that the existence of a prior conviction was merely a 'predicate for an
enhanced sentence, not an element of the offense.' ""0 The court
went on to say that Carachuri-Rosendo "specifically rejected this
argument," even though the statute did not explicitly establish
separate offenses.' Thus, the court concluded that "repetition
transforms the underlying criminal conduct into an aggravated,
different 'offense.' "152
The court then addressed the showings required to enhance a
prior conviction through the defendant's criminal history and through
aggravating factors. To emphasize the need to consider the actual
defendant's criminal history, the court quoted Carachuri-Rosendo's
characterization of the holding in Rodriquez, stating "that a recidivist
finding could set the 'maximum term of imprisonment,' but only when
the finding is a part of the record of conviction."' 153 Thus, without a
recidivist finding in the record, the Government can only rely on the
maximum punishment authorized for a first-time offender.'54
The Fourth Circuit also considered whether aggravating factors
that enhance sentences affect the maximum potential term of
imprisonment of the prior offense. 155 Abandoning its holding in Harp,
the court stated that Carachuri-Rosendo also prevented it from
considering "hypothetical aggravating factors" when determining the
maximum potential term of punishment. 15 6 The court emphasized the
significant procedural protections afforded to North Carolina
defendants, like Simmons, when the prosecutor seeks to enhance a
149. See Simmons 11, 649 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ("Carachuri and
Rodriquez clearly foreclose reliance on Harp.").
150. Id. at 242 (citing Brief for Respondent at 24, Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S.
Ct. 2577 (2010) (No. 09-60), 2010 WL 723015, at *24).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 247.
153. Id. at 243 (quoting Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2587 n.12
(2010)).
154. See id.
155. Id. at 244.
156. Id. The Fourth Circuit also recognized that the Sixth Circuit in United States v.
Pruitt, 545 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2008), held that aggravating factors outside of the record
could increase the potential maximum punishment. Simmons /, 649 F.3d at 244-45 n.4.
The Fourth Circuit emphasized, however, that the Sixth Circuit's holding in Pruitt
occurred prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Carachuri-Rosendo. Id.
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sentence based upon aggravating factors.157 Finding these procedural
protections sufficiently similar to those protections at issue in
Carachuri-Rosendo, the court stated that "Carachuri also forbids us
from considering hypothetical aggravating factors when calculating
Simmons's maximum punishment."'58
Thus, the Fourth Circuit adopted the Actual Defendant
Approach and now considers the actual defendant's situation for both
prior convictions and aggravating factors. Given that "Simmons's
[prior] 1996 North Carolina conviction was for only non-aggravated,
first-time marijuana possession," the subsequent federal sentencing
enhancement did not apply.159 As a result, the Fourth Circuit vacated
his sentence and remanded his case for a new sentencing hearing.16
The dissent in Simmons II largely reiterated the arguments in
Simmons I. First, the dissent maintained that the plain meaning of the
relevant statutory language, "an offense that is punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year," is "offense-based," not
"defendant-based.' 161 The dissent argued that had Congress intended
to adopt the Actual Defendant Approach, it would have written "an
offense for which the defendant is actually subject to punishment by
imprisonment for more than one year." 162
Second, the dissent relied on the fact that the Carachuri-Rosendo
Court had "to perform the requisite state-to-federal offense
'extrapolation' analysis," under which the state conviction had to
qualify as a felony under federal law.163 The dissent elaborated on this
point, stating that the current inquiry "does not raise the question
(from Carachuri) of what hypothetical offense never prosecuted by a
different sovereign the defendant could have been, but was not,
charged with, given the specific characteristics underlying his state
conviction."' 16
Having considered the relevant cases on the Maximum Potential
Term Issue, this Comment now turns to an analysis of the differing
views.
157. Id. at 245.
158. Id. at 244.
159. See id. at 247.
160. Id. at 250.
161. Id. at 251 (Agee, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id. at 252 (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id. at 253.
164. Id. at 254.
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B. Analysis of the Fourth Circuit's Decisions in Simmons I and
Simmons II
This Section considers whether the holding in Simmons II that
Rodriquez and Carachuri-Rosendo overruled Harp was justified. In
so doing, this Section draws on related concepts from Almendarez-
Torres and Apprendi. The analysis focuses on Simmons I and
Simmons II and proceeds by considering the three main arguments in
Simmons I and the Simmons H dissent: (1) the procedural posture of
the case does not require overruling Harp; (2) the immigration
context of Carachuri-Rosendo makes it inapplicable to a criminal
case; and (3) the plain language of the statute does not require
consideration of the actual defendant's situation.
Simmons I began its analysis of how Rodriquez and Carachuri-
Rosendo affect the Fourth Circuit's precedents on the Maximum
Potential Term Issue by noting that the Supreme Court only vacated
and remanded the case presently before the court.165 The Simmons II
dissent also noted the procedural posture of the case.166 While
emphasizing that they could hold that Carachuri-Rosendo does not
affect Fourth Circuit precedent, the dissenters still had to establish
that they should make such a holding.
The responses of the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits suggest
that Carachuri-Rosendo does affect the prior precedents of the
Fourth Circuit.167 The Simmons H majority noted that the Eighth
Circuit had "reversed course" and recognized that Carachuri-
Rosendo required consideration of the actual defendant, specifically
whether a recidivist finding was part of the record of conviction.
161
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that Carachuri-Rosendo does affect
its precedents on the Maximum Potential Term Issue, and the
Government in some cases has conceded as much. 69 The Seventh
Circuit also recognized that Carachuri-Rosendo overruled its
precedent, although the Supreme Court only remanded immigration
165. Simmons I, 635 F.3d 140, 141 (4th Cir. 2011), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3455, remanded to
Simmons I1, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
166. Simmons H, 649 F.3d at 252 (Agee, J., dissenting).
167. For a list of the cases that the Supreme Court remanded in light of Carachuri-
Rosendo, see cases cited supra note 136.
168. Simmons 11, 649 F.3d at 244 (citing United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881,
884 (8th Cir. 2011)).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Ayestas Zelaya, 395 F. App'x 140, 140-41 (5th Cir.
2010).
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cases, not criminal cases, to the Seventh Circuit. 7 ' The Simmons 11
majority summarized how these cases and the Government's
responses to Carachuri-Rosendo undermine the dissent's approach to
the Maximum Potential Term Issue: "[T]he only other appellate
courts to have considered the question have held that Supreme Court
precedent requires rejection of enhancements similar to the one here.
Tellingly, in neither case did the Government seek rehearing en
banc. "171 The opinions of other circuits and the litigation strategies of
parties in similar cases suggest that Carachuri-Rosendo should require
the Fourth Circuit to overrule Harp, but they do not settle the
matter.172 Thus, consideration of the other arguments in Simmons I
and the Simmons II dissent remains necessary.
The second argument of the Simmons II dissent attempted to
distinguish Carachuri-Rosendo, which involved an immigration
proceeding, from the case before it, which involved criminal
sentencing.173 While the dissent recognized that this distinction is not
dispositive, it emphasized differences between the statutes in
question.174 The dissent correctly pointed out that the analysis in
Carachuri-Rosendo involved the additional inquiry of determining
whether the "state conviction could have been an offense that would
be punishable as a federal felony." '175 The dissent further suggested
that this additional inquiry required the Supreme Court to consider
the defendant's specific situation, a requirement that is not necessary
outside of the immigration context. 176 Thus, Carachuri-Rosendo and
Harp can be distinguished along a number of factors, and this calls
into question the extent to which the context of Carachuri-Rosendo
undermines the Hypothetical Defendant with All Enhancements
Approach in Harp.
First, the Supreme Court has held that courts should interpret a
statute consistently when it applies in both criminal and noncriminal
contexts. 17 7 Although the exact provisions at issue in Simmons and
170. See, e.g., Garbutt v. Holder, 395 F. App'x 289, 289-90 (7th Cir. 2010); see also
supra note 136 (citing cases remanded in light of Carachuri-Rosendo and noting the
number of criminal and immigration cases remanded in each circuit).
171. Simmons H, 649 F.3d at 245.
172. See id. at 244-50 (recognizing the decisions of other courts and the litigation
strategy of the parties in those cases but going on to consider the Government's attempts
to distinguish Carachuri-Rosendo).
173. Id. at 252-53 (Agee, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 253-54.
175. Id. at 253.
176. Id. at 253-54.
177. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 n.8 (2004) ("[W]e must interpret the statute
consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context.").
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Carachuri-Rosendo differed, they both required a determination of
the maximum potential term of imprisonment for a prior conviction,
appeared in the Controlled Substances Act, and addressed whether a
state conviction qualified as a felony. 178 The differences in the two
provisions could justify different approaches, but the Court prefers to
treat similar issues in the same manner when the context does not
justify treating them differently. 179 Thus, the significant similarities in
the inquiries in these two cases undermine arguments in the Simmons
II dissent that attempt to distinguish Carachuri-Rosendo.
Second, a prior Fourth Circuit case addressed facts similar to
Carachuri-Rosendo, but it did so in the criminal context. In United
States v. Williams,180 the Fourth Circuit considered whether to apply a
recidivist enhancement to the defendant's prior New Jersey
conviction for purposes of determining the maximum potential term
of imprisonment for that conviction.' Even though the recidivist
enhancement could have applied to the actual defendant, the court
declined to apply it.'82 The court based its decision upon a state
statute similar to the federal procedural safeguards statute in
Carachuri-Rosendo.83 The court emphasized the importance of this
statute when it stated: "To subject Williams to an enhancement now,
based upon a sentence that he could have received only after the
exercise of procedural safeguards, would compromise not only
Williams's statutory rights, but his due process rights as well."'
184
This case suggests that the Carachuri-Rosendo Actual Defendant
Approach would apply in Simmons's case because it occurred in the
criminal sentencing context, not the immigration context. As a result,
the state-to-federal extrapolation analysis on which the Simmons II
dissent relied in distinguishing Carachuri-Rosendo was inapplicable.
Furthermore, it went beyond the Actual Defendant Approach
because the defendant actually was subject to the enhancement. The
court considered the defendant's actual circumstances more
178. Compare Simmons 11, 649 F.3d at 239 (considering a sentencing enhancement
under the Controlled Substances Act to determine whether a state conviction qualified as
a felony), with Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2580-83 (2010) (considering
the meaning of "drug trafficking crime" under the Controlled Substances Act to
determine whether a state conviction qualified as a federal felony for immigration
purposes).
179. See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12 n.8 (supporting consistent interpretation both in the
criminal and noncriminal contexts).
180. 326 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2003).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 539.
183. See id. at 539-40 (describing the state procedural safeguards).
184. Id. at 540.
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thoroughly by also inquiring about the statutorily mandated
procedural safeguards.185 Although a subsequent Fourth Circuit case
suggested that this holding was consistent with Harp,8 6 the court's
consideration of the procedural safeguards and how they applied to
the actual defendant in this criminal context undermines Simmons I
and the Simmons H dissent.
Third, in addition to this prior Fourth Circuit case, the Supreme
Court cited several important criminal cases when analyzing the
proper approach to the Maximum Potential Term Issue in Carachuri-
Rosendo. The Court stated that in Rodriquez it "held that a recidivist
finding could set the 'maximum term of imprisonment,' but only
when the finding is a part of the record of conviction."'87 The
Rodriquez holding undermines the Simmons II dissent's distinction
because Rodriquez did involve criminal sentencing188 and because
consultation of the record of conviction necessarily entails
consideration of the actual defendant's situation.8 9 The Court in
Carachuri-Rosendo also cited Almendarez-Torres for several
important points.19 ° The Supreme Court's citation to these significant
criminal cases in an immigration proceeding suggests that the
different contexts do not justify different approaches to the Maximum
Potential Term Issue.
Fourth, it is not clear why the state-to-federal extrapolation
inquiry would require focusing on the actual defendant, while other
inquiries relating to the Maximum Potential Term Issue would not. If
a state crime had the same elements as a federal crime, then
consideration of the actual defendant's situation would not be
necessary. A court could just take the elements of the state
conviction, match them to the elements of the federal crime, and
185. See id. (requiring that the prosecution honor the defendant's procedural rights for
the prior conviction).
186. See United States v. Williams, 508 F.3d 724, 728-30 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing
that the potential punishment and not the actual punishment controlled).
187. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2587 n.12 (2010) (citing United
States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 394 (2008)).
188. United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 380 (2008) ("At issue in this case is
respondent's sentence on his 2004 conviction.., for possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon.").
189. See id. at 387-89 (discussing the ways in which a court can consult the record of
conviction to determine whether the "conviction was for a qualifying offense").
190. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2581 n.3 (explaining "that the Constitution does
not require treating recidivism as an element of the offense" (citing Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 (1998)); id. at 2582 n.6 (noting that the Constitution does
not require honoring the statutory procedural safeguards at issue in the case); id. at 2586
(emphasizing that a court has the power to make a recidivist finding).
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determine the maximum potential term of imprisonment for the
federal crime. In Carachuri-Rosendo, the Court employed this simple
analysis, but it added an important additional step because it created
an additional "quasi-element" out of the prior conviction. This quasi-
element required that the prosecutor respect the defendant's
statutory procedural rights and that the judge find the existence of a
prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence. 9 In so doing, it
stated that federal law created a separate offense, which it deemed
"recidivist simple possession." '92  Since federal law required
demonstration of this quasi-element as a prerequisite to felony
punishment, and since the record of Carachuri-Rosendo's state
conviction did not contain a valid recidivist finding, the prior
conviction could not qualify as a felony under federal law.193
Moreover, given that the Supreme Court made this quasi-element
part of the offense, it is also specific to the offense. If this quasi-
element constitutes part of the offense under federal law, then its
absence would preclude felony punishment for a defendant convicted
in federal court. Thus, the state-to-federal extrapolation did not
require focusing on the actual defendant.
Furthermore, by removing the extra layer of the state-to-federal
extrapolation and considering merely a federal conviction, it becomes
apparent that the Supreme Court would require consideration of the
actual defendant's situation outside the immigration context. In other
words, if a defendant had a prior conviction that subjected him to
felony punishment under federal law but the prosecutor failed to
respect his statutory procedural rights or the judge failed to find the
prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence, then the prior
conviction would not qualify as a felony; rather, it would only qualify
as a prior conviction for misdemeanor simple possession. 194 The Court
made the mandatory nature of this result in the federal criminal
context clear when it stated, "[f]or federal law purposes, a simple
possession offense is not 'punishable' as a felony unless a federal
prosecutor first elects to charge a defendant as a recidivist in the
criminal information." 195
Accordingly, when addressing the Maximum Potential Term
Issue in the context of a federal conviction, not a state-to-federal
analysis, the Court would go beyond the Actual Defendant
191. Id. at 2581 n.3.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2589-90.
194. Id. at 2581 n.3, 2589-90.
195. Id. at 2587.
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Approach, as the Fourth Circuit did in Williams.196 For a prior
conviction to qualify as "punishable" by a sufficient term of
imprisonment, the defendant could not have been merely subject to
the enhancement; instead, the prosecutor would have had to comply
with the statutory procedural safeguards as well. 197
Nevertheless, Simmons's prior conviction did not occur in federal
court,198 and the Carachuri-Rosendo Court's creation of the separate
offense did depend to some extent on the effect of the federal
procedural protection statute.19 9 The Simmons II majority, however,
highlighted that North Carolina's procedural safeguards are required
for sentencing enhancements.2 00 These prerequisites to an enhanced
sentence likely would operate in the same manner as the federal
statute in Carachuri-Rosendo: they would create a separate offense,
and their absence would prevent an enhanced punishment.
Accordingly, even without the application of the federal statute, the
Simmons H majority correctly considered Simmons's actual situation
when determining his maximum potential term of imprisonment.
Moreover, the Court noted the prevalence of these procedural
safeguards in state criminal codes across the country and emphasized
their importance in allowing prosecutors the discretion to charge
defendants as recidivists. 20 1 This recognition further supports the
Court's requirement that prosecutors and judges consider the actual
defendant's situation for prior state convictions in both immigration
and criminal proceedings. In sum, Simmons I and the Simmons II
dissent's reliance on the different contexts does not seem to justify
disregarding the actual defendant when addressing the Maximum
Potential Term Issue.
In addition to their procedural and contextual arguments,
Simmons I and the Simmons II dissent argued that the plain meaning
of the statute supported their refusal to consider the actual
196. See United States v. Williams, 326 F.3d 535, 539-40 (4th Cir. 2003) (requiring the
prosecution to have honored the defendant's statutory procedural safeguards before
applying a sentencing enhancement to a prior conviction).
197. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2587 (emphasizing that a federal offense is not
punishable by an enhanced sentence unless the prosecution has honored the defendant's
statutory procedural rights).
198. Simmons 11, 649 F.3d 237, 239-40 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
199. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2587-88 (discussing the effects of the federal
procedural protection statute).
200. Simmons 11, 649 F.3d at 240-41.
201. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2588. Given that the Court appeared to require a
judge to find the conviction by a preponderance of the evidence, id. at 2581 n.3, the
outcome likely would remain the same in states that lacked similar procedural safeguards.
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defendant.2 ' The approach that a court takes to this issue depends
largely upon its conception of the words "offense" and "crime." As
Justice Souter's dissent in Rodriquez noted, "[i]t all turns on the
meaning of the word 'offense.' "203 Similarly, in his concurring opinion
in Apprendi, Justice Thomas also highlighted the importance of these
terms, stating: "This case turns on the seemingly simple question of
what constitutes a 'crime.' '0 Accordingly, Apprendi's conception of
a crime may shed some light on this aspect of the Maximum Potential
Term Issue.
In the cases discussed thus far, there have been at least two
competing interpretations of what constitutes an "offense" or a
"crime." First, a court could view an offense as constituting its basic
elements and any sentencing enhancements.20 5 This conception of
offense includes potential sentencing enhancements as part of the
definition of the offense. 26 The majority in Carachuri-Rosendo took
this view of offense when it stated, "we therefore view [the statute's]
felony simple possession provision as separate and distinct from the
misdemeanor simple possession offense that [the statute] also
prescribes. ' 27 Accordingly, for the Court in Carachuri-Rosendo, an
offense constituted the elements as reflected in the defendant's
conduct and a quasi-element for the prior conviction.2 8 Under this
view, a first-time offender and a repeat offender commit different
crimes, even if their underlying conduct was the same. As the
majority in Simmons H noted, "repetition transforms the underlying
criminal conduct into an aggravated, different offense. '
20 9
This view of offense would tend to support the Actual Defendant
Approach because it would require a court to consider whether the
defendant actually was subject to a recidivist enhancement. If the
defendant was not subject to an enhancement, then he was convicted
of a lesser crime with a lesser maximum potential term of
imprisonment. As the Simmons H majority noted, the state statute
"creates separate offenses that in turn yield separate maximum
punishments. '210 Thus, the Supreme Court's distinction between
202. Simmons H, 649 F.3d at 252 (Agee, J., dissenting).
203. United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 394 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting).
204. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 499 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
205. Simmons II, 649 F.3d at 246-47.
206. See id. at 246.
207. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2581 n.3 (2010).
208. See id. (interpreting the statute as requiring this treatment but noting that the
Constitution did not require treating prior convictions as elements).
209. Simmons 11, 649 F.3d at 247 (internal quotation marks omitted).
210. Id.
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simple possession and recidivist simple possession in Carachuri-
Rosendo undermines the Hypothetical Defendant with All
Enhancements Approach established in Harp and supported in the
Simmons H dissent. Under Harp, a court cannot consider whether a
particular criminal statute creates separate offenses depending on the
defendant's actual circumstances.
Second, a court could view an offense as constituting its basic
elements.211 This conception of offense does not include potential
sentencing enhancements in the definition.212 Under this view, a first-
time offender and a repeat offender both commit the same offense,
despite the fact that a repeat offender is subject to an increased
sentence.213 The dissent in Rodriquez preferred this definition of
offense, labeling it the "basic-crime view of offense." '214 Under this
view, determining the maximum potential term of imprisonment
should not take into account any recidivist enhancements because it
should focus only on the defendant's conduct. 15 The dissent in
Simmons II appeared to support this view of an offense when it stated
that a "defendant is convicted of the same offense ... regardless of
his criminal history or the specific characteristics of that offense." '216
While the Simmons II dissent may agree with the Rodriquez dissent
regarding the definition of offense, the two views differ significantly
because the dissent in Simmons H would apply all sentencing
enhancements when determining the maximum potential term of
imprisonment.217 In contrast, Rodriquez argued that courts should not
consider sentencing enhancements when making the calculation.21 In
other words, they agreed about the definition of offense, but they
disagreed about the extent to which offenses are "punishable."
This view of offense could support either of two approaches to
the Maximum Potential Term Issue. Rodriquez argued for the No
Enhancements Approach, which would find the same maximum
potential term of imprisonment for everyone who committed the




214. Id. at 404 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
215. Id. at 384 (majority opinion).
216. Simmons 11, 649 F.3d 237, 256 (2011) (en banc) (Agee, J., dissenting).
217. See id. at 252 (calculating Simmons's maximum potential term of imprisonment
for his prior conviction based upon the statutory maximum).
218. See Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at 384; id. at 393-94 (Souter, J., dissenting) (considering
the maximum punishment for a first-time offender as one way to interpret the statute); id.
at 404 (stating that the competing interpretations are "close to evenly matched" but
preferring the maximum punishment for a first-time offender interpretation).
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crime-the maximum potential term for a first-time offender.219 The
Rodriquez dissent found this approach slightly more convincing than
the approach the majority adopted,22 ° which is discussed more
thoroughly in Part III.C.
This basic definition of offense, however, also could support the
Hypothetical Defendant with All Enhancements Approach. In
support of this approach, the Simmons II dissent argued that the
relevant state statute only constituted a single offense and that
"criminal history and offense characteristics become relevant only at
sentencing."22' Along these lines, defendants whose underlying
conduct is the same commit the same crime. Like the No
Enhancements Approach, courts would consider the same maximum
potential term of imprisonment for everyone who committed the
crime. That maximum potential term, however, would include all
sentencing enhancements, regardless of whether the actual defendant
faced the possibility of any enhancements.
Thus, the relevant cases suggest two general ways of defining an
offense or a crime: either including sentencing enhancements in the
definition or not. The issue increases in complexity significantly,
however, when one considers the distinction between prior
convictions and aggravating factors discussed in Apprendi.222 The
Sixth Circuit in Pruitt interpreted Rodriquez as distinguishing
between these two sentencing enhancements. 223 According to the
Sixth Circuit, the Rodriquez majority supported a hybrid approach to
the Maximum Potential Term Issue, requiring consideration of the
actual defendant's prior convictions and assuming enhancements for
aggravating factors.224 Since the Simmons II dissent only adopted one
way of defining "offense" and one way of defining "punishable," and
since it failed to recognize the potential distinction between recidivist
enhancements and aggravating factor enhancements, it did not adopt
a comprehensive understanding of the Maximum Potential Term
Issue. Given Carachuri-Rosendo's recognition of recidivist offenses 2
25
and Rodriquez's statement about the necessity of the record
219. Id. at 384 (majority opinion).
220. Id. at 404 (Souter, J., dissenting).
221. Simmons 1I, 649 F.3d at 256-57 (Agee, J., dissenting).
222. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487-90 (2000).
223. United States v. Pruitt, 545 F.3d 416, 420-21 (2008).
224. For a discussion of this topic in greater detail, see infra Part III.C.
225. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2581 n.3 (2010).
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containing evidence of the prior conviction,226 the Simmons I
dissent's plain language argument relying on a hypothetical prior
conviction is unsound.
Although the Supreme Court does not appear to have resolved
the influence of aggravating factors on the Maximum Potential Term
Issue, this ambiguity does not undermine the Simmons H majority's
result. For Simmons's prior North Carolina conviction to qualify as a
predicate offense, he would have needed to be subject to
enhancements for both prior convictions and aggravating factors.2 7
At least for prior convictions, the Court appears to have mandated
consideration of the actual defendant's situation. As a result, the
Simmons II majority ruled correctly in vacating his sentence, even if it
potentially did not establish an accurate and comprehensive rule for
determining the maximum potential term of imprisonment for a prior
conviction.
In summary, other appellate courts have found that Rodriquez
and Carachuri-Rosendo do require consideration of the actual
defendant's situation, especially when it comes to inclusion of a
recidivist finding as part of the record of conviction. 28 That the
Government in some of these cases has either conceded this point or
failed to appeal it further undermines the approach in Simmons I and
the Simmons II dissent. Moreover, attempts to distinguish Simmons's
case based upon its relation to criminal sentencing and not an
immigration proceeding do not establish that consideration of the
actual defendant is improper. Finally, the plain language arguments
that the Simmons I court and the Simmons II dissent offered do not
suggest that the Hypothetical Defendant with All Enhancements
approach is entirely correct; accordingly, the Fourth Circuit's
conclusion in Simmons II is correct.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND
UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Rodriquez and Carachuri-Rosendo offer guidance to courts and
lawyers confronted with the Maximum Potential Term Issue.
Unfortunately, the cases ultimately leave some important issues
unresolved. This Part considers some of these unresolved issues.
226. See United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 389 (2008) (explaining that courts
will often have automatic access to records pertaining to a past conviction for sentencing
purposes).
227. Simmons 1, 649 F.3d 237,240-41 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
228. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
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A. Implications of Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion in Carachuri-
Rosendo
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Carachuri-Rosendo
demonstrates that Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi continue to
shape the development of criminal law. Justice Scalia cites
Almendarez-Torres for the propositions that "a defendant is not
'convicted' of sentencing factors" and that "the elements of [a] crime
[do] not include recidivism." 2 9 As a result, he did not apply the
recidivist enhancement in Carachuri-Rosendo, and the prior
conviction could not qualify as an aggravated felony.230 Justice
Scalia's focus on the elements of the underlying conduct and his
disregard of sentencing factors suggest that the maximum potential
term of imprisonment for a first-time offender (i.e., the No
Enhancements Approach) should apply.23' However, Justice Scalia
agreed with the majority in Rodriquez that recidivist enhancements
can increase the maximum term of imprisonment, which suggests that
he may only take this view in the immigration context when
determining whether a state conviction could qualify as a federal
felony.232
The Simmons I dissent seemed to agree with Justice Scalia when
it stated that "[o]nly after a defendant is convicted, at sentencing,
does criminal history come into play." '233 As discussed above,
however, the Simmons H dissent would have applied all
enhancements when considering the extent to which the prior
conviction is punishable. 34 In contrast, Justice Scalia's reliance on
Almendarez-Torres,235 a precursor to Apprendi, suggests that he
would apply aggravating factor enhancements but not recidivist
enhancements. This mixed application accurately reflects the rule in
229. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2590 (Scalia, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 2590-91.
231. This approach would differ from the Simmons H majority as well because it would
never consider a recidivist enhancement when calculating the maximum potential term of
imprisonment. Thus, even if the record of conviction contained a recidivist finding, the
maximum would only be the maximum that a first-time offender would face. The
defendant in Rodriquez made this argument, but the majority rejected it. Rodriquez, 553
U.S. at 385.
232. Id. at 382-84.
233. Simmons 11, 649 F.3d 237,256 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Agee, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 252.
235. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2590 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)).
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Apprendi that aggravating factors that increase the maximum
potential term of imprisonment qualify as elements of the offense. 236
In addition to demonstrating the continual influence of
Almendarez- Torres and Apprendi, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
also reflects an important departure from the position he took in both
of those cases. His dissent in Almendarez-Torres questioned whether
the Constitution required treating a prior conviction as an element.237
Similarly, in Apprendi, he joined Justice Thomas's concurring
opinion, which maintained that a prior conviction that enhanced the
maximum potential sentence qualified as an element and established
a separate offense.238
In Carachuri-Rosendo, Justice Scalia could have relied on his
positions in these prior cases to emphasize that the prosecutor failed
to charge the defendant as a recidivist and to provide the procedural
safeguards of jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Absent
these constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards for elements
of an offense, Justice Scalia then could have suggested that the
defendant was not convicted of a state offense that corresponded to a
federal felony because the prior conviction element was lacking.
Instead, Justice Scalia firmly embraced the reasoning of Almendarez-
Torres and treated the prior conviction as a sentencing factor.239 In
other words, when determining whether Carachuri-Rosendo was
convicted of an aggravated felony, Justice Scalia relied on the
Almendarez-Torres majority's conception of a prior conviction as a
sentencing factor rather than his dissenting opinion's conception of a
prior conviction as an element. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in
Carachuri-Rosendo thus provides a clear indication that he intends to
respect the precedent of Almendarez-Torres going forward and that
he likely expects his fellow Justices to follow suit.
B. Potential Effects of Different Language in Federal Statutes
Invoking the Maximum Potential Term Issue
Until now, this Comment has disregarded some variations in the
statutory language in the relevant cases. While all of these statutes
invoke the Maximum Potential Term Issue, and while for the sake of
236. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 492-95 (2000) (rejecting the State's attempt
to characterize a biased-purpose aggravating factor enhancement as a sentencing factor
instead of an element).
237. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 260 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
238. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring).
239. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2590-91 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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clarity one would hope that the Supreme Court or Congress would
adopt a uniform and comprehensive approach to the issue in the
future, these variations require attention. In Rodriquez, the inquiry
concerned the defendant's prior convictions for "serious drug
offense[s]," defined in relevant part as offenses where a "maximum
term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law."24 In
Carachuri-Rosendo, the statute addressed a "drug trafficking crime,"
defined as "any felony punishable under ... the Controlled
Substances Act"; additional statutes provided that the relevant issue
concerned whether Carachuri-Rosendo had "been convicted of a[n]
aggravated felony," defined in relevant part as a crime for which the
"maximum term of imprisonment authorized" was "more than one
year."24' In Simmons II, the statute provided a sentence enhancement
for when the defendant, among other things, had "a prior conviction
for... [an] offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year." '242 These three examples differ in certain respects, but they
all invoke the Maximum Potential Term Issue.
Notably, the three portions of these statutes that suggest the
potential punishment controls differ. One states "prescribed by
law"243 : another uses the word "authorized"; 2  and the third reads
"punishable.""24 The differences only create more questions: do these
different formulations of the Maximum Potential Term Issue justify
different results? Did Congress intend as much by using different
words? Should courts infer a different intent based upon these
differences? Full consideration of the statutory history underlying
these variations and others in the United States Code could provide
some clarity; however, such a comprehensive review of legislative
history is outside the scope of this Comment. Nevertheless, future
cases and additional legal scholarship could address these differences.
C. Aggravating Factors Versus Prior Convictions and Constitutional
Requirements Versus Statutory Interpretation
Apprendi treats aggravating factors and prior convictions
differently. Assuming an aggravating factor increases the maximum
240. United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 380 (2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2006)).
241. Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2581 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B),
1229b(a)(3) (2006); 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(2), 3559(a) (2006)).
242. Simmons H, 649 F.3d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(b)(1)(B)(vii), 802(44) (2006)).
243. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
244. Id. § 3559(a).
245. 21 U.S.C. § 802(44).
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potential term of imprisonment, it qualifies as an element, and the
prosecution must include it in the indictment, submit it to the jury,
and prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. 46 In contrast, a prior
conviction does not qualify as an element, and the judge need only
find it by a preponderance of the evidence to subject a defendant to
an increased maximum potential term of imprisonment.247 The Court
based these requirements on the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the
Constitution.248
Although the Court has made clear these constitutional
requirements for enhancing a sentence, the statutory requirements
for determining the maximum potential term of imprisonment for a
prior conviction remain unresolved. Based upon Rodriquez and
Carachuri-Rosendo, the Court appears to require that the record
reflect a finding that the actual defendant was subject to a recidivist
enhancement. In Rodriquez, the Court stated: "[I]n those cases in
which the records that may properly be consulted do not show that
the defendant faced the possibility of a recidivist enhancement, it may
well be that the Government will be precluded from establishing that
a conviction was for a qualifying offense." '249 In Carachuri-Rosendo,
the Court described its holding in Rodriquez: "We held that a
recidivist finding could set the 'maximum term of imprisonment,' but
only when the finding is a part of the record of conviction. ' 25° The
Carachuri-Rosendo Court also stated that although "the Constitution
does not require treating recidivism as an element of the offense...
the fact of a prior conviction must still be found-if only by a judge
246. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (quoting Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
247. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 248 (1997) ("[W]e express no
view on whether some heightened standard of proof might apply to sentencing
determinations that bear significantly on the severity of sentence."). The Court's
reservation of judgment on whether a higher burden than preponderance of the evidence
could apply to significant enhancements suggests that due process requires at least a
preponderance of the evidence for a recidivist enhancement. See United States v. Watts,
519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) (stating that "we have held that application of the preponderance
standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process" and recognizing that some courts
have considered whether the Due Process Clause requires a clear and convincing evidence
standard for significant enhancements). The fact that Justices Thomas and Scalia
expressed their support for requiring all the procedural safeguards associated with
traditional elements provides support for this proposition. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
500-01 (Thomas, J., concurring).
248. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 500 ("In order for an accusation of a crime (whether by
indictment or some other form) to be prope.r under the common law, and thus proper
under the codification of the common-law rights in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it
must allege all elements of that crime.").
249. United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 389 (2008).
250. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2587 n.12 (2010).
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and if only by a preponderance of the evidence-before a defendant
is subject to [the enhanced punishment]. 251
These statements suggest that despite the Court's focus on
statutory interpretation, it either applied the constitutional
requirements necessary to enhance a sentence based upon a prior
conviction (i.e., a judge's finding by a preponderance of the
evidence), or it interpreted the statute as requiring as much. These
statements of the Court in the context of the Maximum Potential
Term Issue suggest that the Court requires more than the Actual
Defendant Approach when it comes to prior convictions.
Whether or not the Constitution or statutory interpretation
provides the basis for applying these requirements for prior
convictions in the context of the Maximum Potential Term Issue, it
remains unclear whether the Court would do the same for
aggravating factors. In other words, would the Court require that an
aggravating factor that would enhance a prior conviction receive the
heightened constitutional protections in Apprendi (i.e., notice, jury
trial, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt)? 252 If so, what would
these requirements entail in the context of the Maximum Potential
Term Issue? Just like with recidivist enhancements, this approach
would provide defendants with procedural protections beyond the
Actual Defendant Approach. The prosecutor could not rely on an
aggravating factor to set the maximum potential term of
imprisonment simply because the record reflects the qualifying fact
but does not reflect all of these procedural safeguards. For example, if
the indictment charged the defendant with committing a crime while
possessing a weapon but the defendant pled guilty to a non-
aggravated version of the offense or the prosecutor subsequently
failed to submit such a factor to the jury, then courts could only rely
on the non-aggravated version's maximum potential term of
imprisonment.
Applying these requirements would make the Court's treatment
of offenses in the constitutional Apprendi context consistent with the
context of the Maximum Potential Term Issue, but the Court's
jurisprudence remains inconsistent. For example, in Pruitt, the Sixth
Circuit held that Rodriquez required considering the actual
defendant's situation for prior convictions, but not for aggravating
factors. 253 The Sixth Circuit based this distinction on two aspects of
251. Id. at 2581 n.3.
252. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
253. See United States v. Pruitt, 545 F.3d 416, 419-23 (6th Cir. 2008).
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the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriquez: (1) the requirement that
courts consult the record to determine whether the defendant was
subject to a recidivist enhancement, and (2) the fact that a guidelines
system did not cap the maximum potential term of imprisonment.254
When considering aggravating factors, however, the Court in
Rodriquez made a puzzling and apparently contradictory statement:
"We conclude, however, that the phrase 'maximum term of
imprisonment ... prescribed by law' for the 'offense' was not meant
to apply to the top sentence in a guidelines range. ' 255 In so doing, the
Court rejected the defendant's argument that "mandatory guidelines
systems that cap sentences can decrease the 'maximum term' of
imprisonment," which is merely "the term to which the state court
could actually have sentenced the defendant. ' 256  The Court
apparently intended for this rule to apply beyond the context of
recidivist enhancements because the prior conviction would not have
qualified if it did not apply to aggravating factors as well. 257 Although
this rule may have made sense if the Court limited it to advisory
guidelines that would not require notice, jury trial, and proof beyond
a reasonable doubt for the enhancement, the Court appeared to
endorse its application in the context of mandatory guidelines as
well.256
This portion of the Court's holding in Rodriquez undermines the
application of Apprendi's constitutional requirements in the context
of the Maximum Potential Term Issue. While the prior conviction at
issue in Rodriquez occurred before Apprendi and Blakely,2 9 the
Court made no attempt to limit its rule to cases decided before these
important precedents. It is also worth noting that Justices Thomas
and Scalia, both of whom previously supported considering both
recidivist enhancements and aggravating factors as elements in
Apprendi, joined the majority in Rodriquez.260 Their failure to offer
any indication that they believed the constitutional requirements of
Apprendi applied in the context of the Maximum Potential Term
Issue further undermines the likelihood that the Supreme Court
254. Id. at 422-23.
255. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at 390.
256. Id.
257. Brief for Respondent at 44-45, United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008)
(No. 06-1646). The defendant also argued that "there is a strong argument that the
guidelines themselves define the 'offense' for purposes both of state law and of the
ACCA." Id.
258. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at 390-91.
259. Id. at 390-92.
260. Id. at 379.
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would do so in the future. The Court, however, could hold in a
subsequent case that this proposition only amounted to dicta that did
not control the outcome of future cases because the Court noted that
the defendant had conceded any argument to the contrary.16' This
concession of the issue was perplexing for two reasons: (1) the Court
cited the Government's brief for the concession, not the defendant's;
and (2) the defendant specifically stated that he had not conceded the
point in his brief.262 The validity of the concession aside, the Court
could use this portion of Rodriquez as a means of avoiding this
apparently inconsistent precedent.
If the Sixth Circuit is correct about the Supreme Court's
treatment of aggravating factors,263 the Court's opinion in Rodriquez
inverts the degree of procedural protections for prior convictions and
aggravating factors. Thus, when it comes to the Apprendi
constitutional context, aggravating factors receive the status of
elements, affording defendants the protections of notice, jury trial,
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, while recidivist enhancements
remain sentencing factors only requiring a judge's finding by a
preponderance of the evidence.
In contrast, in the statutory interpretation context of the
Maximum Potential Term Issue, the Court provides prior convictions
these same constitutional protections, but aggravating factor
enhancements receive no protections at all. This result seems odd
because an aggravating factor creates a separate offense in the
constitutional context and, therefore, a defendant subject to the
enhancement is not convicted of the same offense as a defendant who
is not subject to the enhancement, 64 in which case different maximum
potential terms of imprisonment would apply. In the Maximum
Potential Term Issue context, however, the Court in Carachuri-
Rosendo indicated that recidivist enhancements can result in the
creation of separate and distinct offenses with different corresponding
maximum potential terms of imprisonment.
261. Id. at 390.
262. Brief for Respondent, supra note 257, at 45 n.22.
263. The circuit court's distinction between a statute that it claimed "clearly focuse[d]
on the circumstances of the particular juvenile and not on the offense" supports the
premise that the Supreme Court assumes aggravating factors and does not consider the
actual defendant in this context. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at 392-93.
264. Rodriquez made this argument with respect to guidelines, see Brief for
Respondent, supra note 257, at 38-46, but the Court rejected it. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at
390-93. The dissent in Pruitt also recognized this argument. See United States v. Pruitt,
545 F.3d 416, 427 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
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Despite this apparent theoretical inconsistency, it is
counterintuitive that the Constitution actually requires that Apprendi
principles apply to the Maximum Potential Term Issue. To evaluate
this proposition, one only need consider whether Congress has the
constitutional power to enact a statute that adopted the Hypothetical
Defendant with All Enhancements Approach (e.g., a statute that
applied a conditional provision to "anyone convicted of a crime for
which any person convicted of the same crime could receive a term of
imprisonment of one year or more"). The Supreme Court's erosion of
statutory interpretation in this way will perhaps prompt Congress to
respond by passing such a statute and testing the Court's view of its
constitutionality.
On the other hand, perhaps Congress or the Court will recognize
the virtues of applying Apprendi to the Maximum Potential Term
Issue. One would expect a more accurate basis for the application of
conditional provisions because the prior court would have respected
the increased individualized consideration associated with Apprendi's
procedural safeguards. 65 One would also expect increased fairness
because the defendants learn about their own potential sentences, not
the sentence that a hypothetical defendant with the worst criminal
history and the most aggravating factors could receive. In contrast,
the hypothetical defendant approach in Harp does have the
administrative benefit of subjecting all defendants convicted of a
crime to the same conditional provisions.266 Accordingly, once courts
have settled what crimes trigger which provisions, the law becomes
clear and does not require individualized consideration. While such
policy considerations generally are best left to the legislature, until
Congress makes its intent clear, the courts will continue to face cases
that require further definition of the contours of the Maximum
Potential Term Issue.
CONCLUSION
The Maximum Potential Term Issue has significant consequences
in a wide variety of contexts. One can hardly overstate the complexity
of the issue when considering the abstract constitutional issues, the
myriad federal statutes in various forms, and the diversity of state
sentencing systems. As the Supreme Court develops constitutional
265. See Davis, supra note 33, at 372-73 (arguing for the actual sentence imposed as
the measure because more individualized consideration would more accurately reflect the
culpability of the defendant).
266. Cf id. (noting the administrative convenience of adopting an approach based
upon the sentence imposed).
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law in the criminal context, its decisions will have significant effects
on the Maximum Potential Term Issue. Future cases and additional
legal scholarship likely will have to consider the implications of
different federal statutes operating in the context of varied sentencing
systems. To avoid further complicating the issue, Congress or the
Supreme Court could attempt to develop a uniform approach that
does not vary by statute and by state. In an effort to aid this
development, this Comment has sought to provide relevant
background and to frame pertinent issues. In the future, through
cases like Carachuri-Rosendo, the Supreme Court will hopefully shed
additional light on the Maximum Potential Term Issue.
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